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ABSTRACT 
In 2011, UK heritage railways carried 7.1 million passengers on over 530 miles of track, accounting for 
£92 million of direct revenue. Much of this operation uses steam locomotives with relatively high axle 
loads and reciprocating motion which can lead to uneven track loading. However the majority of track 
components on heritage lines are antiquated due to reliance on cascaded components and in some cases 
on the deliberate retention of chaired bullhead rail for conservational purposes.  
This research provides an assessment of current methodologies regarding the management of steel rails 
on heritage railways: the measurement of rail wear, the assessment of the residual strength in worn rails 
and the subsequent determination of a rail’s critical wear limit. It describes the effectiveness and 
adequacy of some of the inspection regimes in use and addresses the risks associated with the variation in 
these regimes across the sector. 
A survey of permanent way supervisors on UK standard gauge heritage lines is reported and the 
permanent way in use is and the perceived requirements for its renewal are summarised. Due to low 
speeds and traffic levels, the main line standards for rail wear are generally thought to be inappropriate 
for heritage railway use whilst ‘high-tech’ methods for measuring crack propagation and rail wear are 
inaccessible due to cost. A common approach is to employ inspection and maintenance regimes 
developed by British Rail for use on rural lines. 
Utilising a fracture mechanics approach to predicting rail failure developed in the USA, the research 
highlights a more relevant set of guidelines, providing a matrix detailing acceptable wear limits based on 
inspection frequency, rail type, formation condition and traffic levels.  
The findings will benefit the heritage rail industry by minimising risk whilst accounting for resource 
limitations. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Across the UK there are over 100 operating heritage railways (HRs), running a huge variety of rolling 
stock on over 530 miles of track. In 2011 this industry accounted for £92 million of the UK’s tourist 
revenue and carried over 7 million passengers on lines across the country. The lines are operated by as 
many as 2200 permanent staff and 18500 volunteers (Lord Faulkner 2011) with a wide range of expertise 
and an extensive if unconsolidated knowledge base, with years of experience.  
  
As with their locomotives and rolling-stock, HR track is often old. Many lines deliberately set out to use 
jointed, chaired bullhead rails (BH), typically of 95 lb/yard section, to maintain a ‘steam-age’ atmosphere, 
at least in their stations, and since new supplies of BH are difficult to obtain in moderate quantities at a 
reasonable price, use is made of recycled rails and components cascaded from mainline or other non-
heritage sources, with these having already experienced loss of cross section due to wear. This worn 
material is then retained in service for longer periods than might be the case on the mainline network 
before renewal. HRs also operate with restricted resources, and for this reason are keen to use donated or 
cheaply bought worn and recycled track components where possible. 
This situation presents a management issue for HRs, which generally operate at considerably slower line 
speeds and reduced annual tonnages of traffic compared with the mainline, but often employ historic 
steam locomotives with relatively high axle loadings and reciprocating motion that can be difficult to 
balance perfectly. Nevertheless, UK HRs are subject to the same requirement to ensure the safety of 
passengers, staff and third parties as mainline railway companies, with operational safety being overseen 
by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). Of particular concern to the ORR is the requirement to determine 
whether given recycled rail components are safe for traffic if they exhibit considerable signs of wear. 
This paper examines the use of worn rails on UK HRs from the perspective of both HR management and 
regulators and sets out to establish a scientific basis for defining limits of wear for acceptable use of worn, 
recycled rails in an HR context. 
EXISTING STANDARDS AND HR MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Limits for head height loss and gauge-face width loss due to wear in the mainline context are derived 
from the Railway Group Standards (RGS) (Railway Group Standards 2011). In this standard, the 
maximum allowable head wear on 95lb BH varies with dynamic axle loading. Assuming a dynamic axle 
loading of 30 tons (corresponding to a 22.5 ton static axle loading typical of many larger steam 
locomotives) the standard permits rail head height loss of just over 5mm before renewal, this being less 
than a 7% reduction in rail cross sectional area. At the other extreme, the maximum head wear before 
flange strikes on fishplates become inevitable is 14.8mm for 95 lb BH. This is just under a 20% reduction 
in rail cross sectional area. For side wear, the RGS limit is 9 mm off either face, or a minimum width of 
52mm.  
The authors carried out a telephone survey of HR permanent way managers during 2012-2013. This 
remains on-going, but so far 20 of the 70 standard gauge heritage lines have been questioned, covering a 
total of 187 miles of running line, 45% of the total of UK standard gauge HR running line. It was found 
that 69% of this was laid in BH with 31% in flat-bottomed rail (FB), all of it on a variety of ages and 
types of sleeper and fastening and sourced from a variety of places including British Rail (BR) and former 
power stations or industrial sites. The most common BH section was 95 lb/yard except on former Great 
Western Railway lines where it was 97.5 lb/yard. The oldest rail still in traffic dated from 1918 with rails 
from the 1920s and 1930s being very common.  
Traffic levels ranged from 17 trains/day down to 2 trains/day or less, with static axle loads of 22.5 to 25 
tons being common. 
Most lines surveyed tended to operate weekly line walks during their running season with less frequent 
supervisor or civil engineer inspections and only occasional technological monitoring such as geometry 
  
measurement. ‘High tech’ inspections such as use of Track Recording Vehicles or ultrasound surveys of 
rail materials were rare and typically only carried out where these were available at no or reduced cost 
due to local arrangements with mainline companies.  
In terms of maintenance intervention standards, a wear rate of 1 mm of head height loss per ten years in 
use was commonly quoted. This has previously been adopted by engineers on some rural mainlines such 
as those in northern Scotland (Hill-Smith 1989). It was common for RGS wear limit figures to be known, 
but equally a common rule of thumb was “at or slightly above the bottom of the side” for gauge-face side 
wear. Head wear, on the other hand, had no identifiable common approach, with some lines rigorously 
applying RGS standards and others stating that indications of fishplate flange strikes were the point at 
which head wear was addressed. 
In general, rail wear was not considered a threat to services, with a total of only 22 rail break incidents in 
the last ten years, affecting only six HR passenger services. It was noted that rail breaks were often 
associated with a particular batch of rails, suggesting material issues rather than just long use. Bolt hole 
failures were more common, but the biggest threat to safety was regarded as in-gauge track misalignment 
due to buckling and excessive cant gradient. 
It was felt that there was sometimes insufficient clarity from the ORR regarding operating standards, with 
HRs being expected to maintain track standards such as Network Rail or RGS standards. There was also 
frustration at ‘buying blind’, with better records for rails being needed to identify the remaining life in 
recycled rails and to isolate poor batches of rail. 
On the other hand, discussions with the ORR indicate that their difficulty is the lack of scientific 
foundation on which to assess the safety of worn, recycled rails. Combined with the hugely varying 
nature of HR track and the wide variety of management practices discussed above, this leads to a highly 
unsatisfactory situation in ensuring the safety of the HR sector. 
RISK DUE TO RAIL FAILURE 
Rail defects have, in fact, accounted for a series of incidents on the UK mainline network, the most 
serious recent event being the Hatfield incident of 2000, in which four people were killed due to a rail 
break resulting from rolling contact fatigue (Office of Rail Regulation 2006). The most fatalities in a 
single rail-defect related incident occurred at Hither Green in 1967 when 49 people died in a derailment 
caused by bolt-hole cracking (McMullen 1968). 
Both these incidents occurred at speeds of 70 mph or more on the mainline network. Whilst there have 
been no serious incidents related to rail defects on UK HRs, there have been incidents at low speeds on 
the mainline network arising from causes which could have occurred on HRs. Table 1 summarises such 
incidents reported between 1900 and 2012, noting the number that occurred at speeds of 30mph or less, 
corresponding roughly to HR operating conditions. 
The highest number of incidents at sub-30mph speeds correspond to switch and crossing (S&C) issues 
and track geometry faults, but mid-section rail failure and flange climb on worn rail profiles, both of 
which depend on the amount and type of rail wear, account for nine derailments out of a total of fourteen 
such incidents at all speeds. 
  
The risk of derailment due to the use of recycled track components under HR-like operating conditions 
cannot therefore be said to be zero. 
Table 1: Significant UK derailments from track defects (1900-2012) 
(sourced from The Railways Archive: www.railwaysarchive.co.uk) 
Incident Type Total Number Number at speeds 
of 30mph or less 
Failure of switch and crossing (S&C) 
components 
23 15 
Gauge wideneing from track system failure 
(chair/sleeper/substrate) 
25 14 
In-gauge track misalignment (eg buckle) 53 14 
Poor curve layout (eg excessive cant 
gradient) 
15 9 
Mid-section rail failure 12 7 
Overloaded track system 4 2 
Flange climb on worn rail profile 2 2 
Bolt-hole failure 11 0 
Welded joint failure 2 0 
Total Incidents 147 63 
 
 
Figure 1: 95 lb/yard bullhead rail showing simplified geometry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35.32mm 
68.95mm 
68.95mm 
19.45mm 
9
0
.5
3
m
m
 
1
9
.0
5
m
m
 
  
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF RAIL STRENGH 
Bending stresses 
One approach to developing a scientific assessment of the strength of rails is simply to consider them as a 
beam. In 1867, Winkler proposed that a rail could be satisfactorily modelled as a beam on an elastic 
foundation (Barati and Sadeghi 2010). In order to apply this approach, a 95 lb BH was assumed to be a 
simple I-beam with dimensions as shown in white in Figure 1. This assumption fractionally increases the 
quantity of material at the extreme fibres of the cross-section, leading to a 7% overestimation of the total 
cross sectional area and a second moment of area of 1419cm4 as opposed to the 1458cm4 quoted for 95 lb 
BH in BS11:1985. This discrepancy was considered to be negligible for the purposes of this analysis. 
Analysing the rail as a linear elastic Euler beam (as detailed by both (Jeong 2003) and (Hunt 2005)) and 
using a yield stress for rail steel of 406Nmm-2 (Ringsberg, Loo-Moorey et al. 2000), a factor of safety can 
then be found comparing the imposed bending moment from traffic loading with the required moment for 
the rail to fail. This was done for a range of wear values and an assumed vertical loading of 300 kN 
(corresponding approximately to a 30 ton dynamic axle loading as discussed above). The factors of safety 
were found to be between 6 and 9, as shown in Table 2. This implies that full section yield would not 
occur in pure bending, even with over a 40% reduction in rail head cross-sectional area. 
Table 2: Factors of safety calculated from bending moment considerations 
Head height 
loss 
∆h (mm) 
Vertical second 
moment of area 
Iyy (cm4) 
Safety factor for 
elastic bending 
γe 
Safety factor for full 
section yield 
γp 
0 1418.5 7.6 8.9 
4 1297.7 7.2 8.5 
8 1178.8 6.7 8.2 
12 1061.2 6.2 7.8 
16 944.1 5.7 7.3 
20 826.8 5.1 6.8 
Fracture mechanics 
The bending stress approach is, intuitively, unrealistically un-conservative: rails are not for practical 
purposes that strong. An alternative approach is that of fracture mechanics, which was initially developed 
within the aeronautical industry, and several methodologies have been investigated for use in the rail 
industry (Rail Safety and Standards Board 2006). Its use has been expanded in research on behalf of the 
American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) and the International 
Union of Railways (UIC) (Lyons, Jeong et al. 2010) and included some observation of low speed, high 
axle load rail vehicles in the form of freight traffic in the USA. It is this analysis methodology that has 
been pursued here. 
Fracture mechanics assumes that a rail cross section has an inherent detail flaw in the rail head area and 
finds stress intensity factors from both the residual stress in the rail from the fracture and the bending 
stress resulting from the traffic loading. In tests conducted in both laboratory conditions and through 
samples taken from running lines, these detail flaws were found to be detectable when their cross-
sectional area was greater than 5% of the rail head area, and in most cases led to rail failure when they 
reached a size greater than 50% of the rail head area (Jeong 2003). 
  
Flaws manifest themselves as tache ovals in rail sections and as transverse cracks (Kumar 2006). Tache 
oval defects were common on the British mainline until the 1980s when improvements in both steel 
manufacturing and inspection techniques largely eliminated them as a problem (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board 2006). Until this, however, such cracks represented over 15% of recorded rail failures (Tunna 
1989), so it is reasonable to assume that they are present in a significant number of recycled, worn rails in 
operation on HRs. 
The fracture analysis on which this work is based (Lyons, Jeong et al. 2010) focuses on US and UIC 60 
FB sections, but here it has been applied to BH, since this rail profile is the most degraded in operation on 
many UK HRs. A schematic representation of a tache oval fracture in a BH rail section is included in 
Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2: Schematic representation of tache oval fracture in bullhead rail head 
(Lyons, Jeong et al. 2010)’s method depends on calculating a stress intensity factor Ki which can be 
compared with the toughness of the rail material. Ki is defined by  = 2  + √ 
(1) 
where σR is the residual stress due to the fracture, σB is the bending stress due to loading, a is the 
horizontal fracture radius and αs, αc and αg are magnification factors due to the shape of the fracture, its 
interaction with the surface of the rail head and the stress in laterally loaded track.  
An assumed value for the fracture horizontal radius a is used leading to a ratio Af/AH describing the area 
of the fracture divided by the total area of the rail head, allowing for any reduction in rail head area due to 
either head or gauge-face side wear. In the present work, αs is then taken as 0.984, corresponding to an 
elliptical fracture with a height to width ratio of 0.7 and αc is determined from  
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For simplicity, our analysis is limited to straight plain line, and αg is therefore assumed to be unity. 
The residual stress in the rail, σR, is then determined following (Clayton and Tang 1992):  = 206.9 − 14.65 
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(3) 
The numbers in equation (3) are empirical factors. It should be noted that the value 68.95 in the second 
line of the right hand side of this equation is unrelated to the rail head width of 68.95 mm of BS11-95R 
BH. 
σB is determined from loading, considering an elastic foundation representative of sleepered, ballasted 
track, as fully explained in (Jeong, Tang et al. 1998). In our case lateral loading was neglected since the 
analysis was for straight track. 
The original analysis was developed for continuous welded rail (CWR) and also includes a thermal stress 
component σT. However in this work we are assuming jointed track as is typical for BH on HRs, and have 
therefore assumed σT to be zero. 
RESULTS  
The analysis described above was carried out for the simplified 95 lb/yard BH section shown in Figure 1, 
a 300 kN vertical load and a range of rail wear and fracture sizes as set out in Table 3. The resulting Ki 
values are plotted in Figure 3 and Error! Reference source not found.. For rail steel with a toughness of 
30 Nmm-2m0.5 (Yates 1996) (shown on the figures by a broad chain line) this gives a matrix of acceptable 
fracture sizes and rail wear as shown in Table 4. 
Table 3: Detail fracture sizes and rail wear used in calculations 
Head height loss calculation Gauge-face width loss calculation 
Detail fracture sizes a 
(mm) 
Rail height loss (head 
wear) (mm) 
Detail fracture sizes a  
(mm) 
Gauge-face width loss 
(side wear) (mm) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
0 
4 
8 
12 
16 
20 
20.0 
20.5 
21.0 
21.5 
22.0 
0 
4 
8 
12 
16 
20 
  
 
Figure 3: Results showing stress intensity factor against head height loss for various detail fracture sizes 
 
Figure 4: Results showing stress intensity factor against gauge-face width loss for various detail fracture 
sizes 
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Table 4: Matrix of acceptable wear levels against detail fracture sizes  
for head height loss and gauge-face width loss 
Head height loss (head wear) Gauge-face width loss (side wear) 
horizontal 
fracture radius a 
(mm) 
critical depth 
reduction ∆h 
(mm) 
horizontal 
fracture radius a 
(mm) 
critical width 
reduction ∆w 
(mm) 
16 16.06 20.0 10.85 
17 13.72 20.5 8.26 
18 11.26 21.0 5.62 
19 8.66 21.5 2.93 
20 5.94 22.0 0.19 
DISCUSSION 
It should be emphasized that for 95 lb BH in jointed track, there is an absolute head wear limit of 14.8 
mm before flange strikes on fishplates will start to occur. Wear will also increase the tendency for 
derailment due to gauge widening and flange-climb, which may well be much more critical than rail 
failure and are not addressed in the foregoing analysis. Similarly, wear on S&C components is likely to 
have a critical impact well before structural failure of the rail is imminent. The results of Table 4 must 
therefore be viewed in this context. 
It should also be noted that this analysis is not conservative in that it does not consider curved track, 
where lateral loading will reduce acceptable wear for a given detail fracture size, or CWR or other track 
where thermal stresses may be significant (including jointed track where the fishplates have not been 
properly lubricated). Only a single loading has been considered, which will not be appropriate for all 
HRs, and further investigation is necessary to prove that the analysis can be applied as it stands to BH 
rail, for which it was not originally developed. Finally, the simplified geometry of Figure 1 will have a 
marginal effect on the results compared with the actual geometry and this should also be checked. 
It can however be seen from the results that for detail fracture sizes in the range examined, and for a 
300 kN loading on straight plain line, critical head wear in the range of around six to 14 mm and critical 
side wear ranging from 0.2 for very large detail fractures up to 11 mm is possible before rail failure. This 
suggests that structural failure of rails will be restricted to severe and relatively rare conditions, even for 
quite worn rail (whilst the other derailment factors such as track geometry will remain significant). 
In order to complete this analysis it is, however, essential to have a realistic view of the detail fracture 
sizes likely to be present in HR rails. The original analysis of (Jeong, Tang et al. 1998) addressed this by 
looking at fracture development in rails as a function of lifetime traffic, considering rails laid new and 
worn in a single usage situation. 
On UK HRs, the use of rails is very different from this: they are typically pre-worn when sourced and 
may already have been used in several locations and subject to several different traffic patterns and 
loadings. The kind of analysis undertaken by (Jeong, Tang et al. 1998) is therefore impossible in this 
context. There is also the issue of potentially flawed batches of rail which arose in the telephone survey of 
HR permanent way managers discussed above. 
  
The only meaningful way forward would be to undertake a programme of testing of rails in use, or being 
considered for use, on HRs and determine the number and size distribution of fractures likely to be 
present. This is a subject for future research. 
Also a subject for future research specific to the HR context is the appropriate tolerance for gauge, cant 
gradient, S&C and other alignment issues in low speed, low tonnage and high axle load situations. A 
great deal of literature exists on wheel-rail interaction generally, and it would be helpful to review this in 
a structured way from the HR operation perspective. 
In the meantime the foregoing analysis suggests that from the point of view of HR management and 
regulators, the structural integrity of the rails is likely to be of relatively limited significance in the safe 
operation of HRs when compared with derailment risks due to other causes such as buckling, excessive 
cant gradient and wear effects on gauge and on S&C, which can usually be addressed by maintenance not 
involving significant rail replacement. This implies that recycled rails, even when considerably worn, will 
often be safely usable provided that track geometry is properly maintained, with consequent useful 
implications for the limited resources of HR management. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The use of worn rails on UK HRs has been examined from the perspective of both HR management and 
regulators. 
A telephone survey of permanent way managers showed that a significant mileage of BH remains in use, 
with many rails being 80-100 years old. Traffic was always less than 17 trains/day and rail wear was not 
thought to be a problem with the number of rail break incidents being low and sometimes linked to poor 
batches of material. Renewal practices varied but in terms of head height loss were often linked to 
incipient flange strikes on fishplates. 
A fracture mechanics approach developed in the USA was applied to determine the strength of rails under 
a 300 kN load corresponding roughly to a heavy steam locomotive, assuming 95 lb/yard BH on straight 
plain line. It was found that for detail fracture sizes ranging from 15 to 22mm, safe head wear was in the 
range 14 mm down to 6 mm and safe side wear ranged from 11 mm to 0.2 mm. Fracture sizes are 
however assumed, and further work is needed to identify typical values in HR rails. 
These limits are for the structural integrity of the rail only: other wear-related derailment risks such as 
gauge widening due to side wear, increased risk of flange climb and defects in S&C components were not 
included in the analysis and further work is needed to quantify these in a specifically HR context. 
The findings indicate that in the overall context of the safety of UK HR operations, structural failure of 
recycled rails due to wear is not likely to be significant compared with other risks to track geometry and 
alignment, which can often be addressed without rail replacement.  
This finding will provide some assistance to regulators in assessing the safety of HR permanent way and 
has useful implications for the limited resources of HR management. 
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